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CHRISTIANITY AND THE LARGE SCALE CORPORATION
David A. Skeel, Jr.2

Ask most people what they associate with “Christianity and the corporation” and,
at least in the US, they may mention activist nuns calling for shareholder votes on
sweatshop labor, nuclear weapons or divestment from South Africa, or perhaps a
newspaper story about mutual funds that invest only in “faith friendly” corporations.
Each is a contemporary manifestation of relations that run far deeper, and date back well
over a thousand years. The early church spawned many of the largest corporate
enterprises of the middle ages, and tenaciously promoted the concept of a collective
entity distinct from the state. When the modern large scale corporation emerged in the
nineteenth century, Christian responses were more complicated. Many worried about the
effects of limited liability, and evangelical populists insisted that railroads and other large
corporations needed to be tamed by governmental regulation. But others held very
different views. More recently, Christians perspectives have tended divide between those
who view large scale corporations as an essential counterbalance to state power that
should be free from governmental interference, and those who favor a much firmer
regulatory grip.
This chapter traces these Christian attitudes toward and influence on the large
scale corporation. We begin with the pre-history, the emergence of key attributes of the
corporate form in Western Europe in the late Roman Empire and thereafter. From there,
we turn to England and the United States, where the corporation achieved its modern
form in the mid nineteenth century. The remainder of the chapter focuses most
extensively on the United States, which saw a remarkable proliferation of large, widely
held corporations as a result of the so-called Great Merger Wave at the end of the
nineteenth century. We are now in the midst of another upheaval. While the corporate
1
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form itself has not changed, the advent of new financing techniques has simultaneously
provided new tools for, and put more pressure on, corporate managers. It is too early to
define the Christian contributions to these developments with any precision, but just the
right time to consider some of the possibilities.
Because the chapter focuses on large scale corporations, it treats partnerships and
some of the new business entity forms that have emerged in recent decades only in
passing. But I will make reference to exciting recent work that explores these other
developments. Because of my own religious orientation, and because the center of
gravity shifts to the United States when large scale corporations emerge, the chapter also
has a somewhat Protestant feel. But Catholic thought and influence features both in the
beginning and in the end.

Pre-History of the Modern Corporation

The standard definition of the corporation focuses on five key characteristics:
limited liability (meaning that the corporation’s shareholders are not personally liable for
its debts), free transferability of ownership interests (shares can be sold by one investor to
another), continuity of existence (the corporation is “immortal;” it continues indefinitely,
even if individual shareholders die or go bankrupt), centralized management (the
management role is distinct from ownership, so that the corporation can be run by
professional managers who need not own stock), and entity status (the corporation is a
distinct entity with, among other things, the power to hold property and to sue or be sued
in its own name). By contract and in its constitutional documents, a corporation may
waive one or more of these attributes. Small corporations often restrict the transferability
of the company’s stock to ensure that it does not get into undesirable hands, for instance,
and shareholders relinquish a portion of their limited liability if they agree to guaranty a
key corporate obligation such as a bank loan. But in principle, corporations have each of
the five characteristics.
The most recognizable and consciously sought after attribute is the first, limited
liability. Limited liability is indeed hugely important; as we shall see, it occasioned sharp
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rhetorical clashes, with theological artillery on both sides, in nineteenth century England.
But in a series of pathbreaking recent articles, Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraackman
(joined in their most recent effort by Richard Squire) contend that the key historical
development actually was legal recognition of the last of the attributes, entity form.3 Of
particular importance is the quality they call “entity shielding.” If the entity is governed
by “weak” entity shielding, as partnerships are, creditors of the entity have first dibs on
its assets, prior to any claims of creditors of the owners of the entity. Thus, if a
partnership fails, its assets are distributed to partnership creditors before any creditors of
individual partners are entitled to any share. With corporations, which enjoy “strong”
entity shielding, another type of entity shielding is added: liquidation protection. Neither
a shareholder nor a personal creditor of a shareholder can force the corporation to pay out
the shareholder’s ownership stake in the corporation. It is far more difficult than with a
partnership for shareholders to liquidate their stake; consequently, the corporate entity
has superior staying power.4
Not only does entity shielding provide essential benefits (it simplifies the
monitoring that entity creditors need to do, and reduces the risk that vibrant enterprises
will be dismembered if an owner dies or goes bankrupt), it also is the only attribute of a
corporation that enterprising business people could not have achieved privately, through
clever use of contractual provisions. To make sure that the claims of entity creditors
came first, each owner would need to persuade every one of her current and future
personal creditors to agree by contract to subordinate their own claims against entity
assets to creditors of the entity. To make matters worse, each owner would be tempted to
cheat, since creditors might be willing to extend personal credit on more generous terms
if their potential claim against the entity were not subordinated. The law solves this
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dilemma by providing entity shielding as one of the attributes that comes with the
decision to form a corporation.
The key characteristics of the corporation emerged fitfully over the centuries, with
bursts of innovation occurring at irregular intervals.5 Its antecedents are often traced to
ancient Rome, which developed a variety of private business forms that foreshadow the
modern corporation in some respects. The peculium, which governed assets managed by
a Roman’s slave, appears to have enjoyed limited liability: creditor suits against the
slave’s master were limited to the value of the peculium itself. When a group of investors
bid on state contracts, they set up an entity, the societas publicanorum, that functioned
very much like a modern limited partnership. Investors who did not participate in
management enjoyed limited liability, whereas managing partners were personally liable
for the debts of the venture. Ownership interests were freely traded, and the societas
publicanorum appears to have subject to strong entity shielding with respect to its limited
partners. A few centuries later, in medieval and renaissance Italy, the resurgence of
vibrant commercial enterprise was accompanied by another cluster of new business
forms. The compania, the principal partnership form, evolved to provide a
geographically oriented form of weak entity shielding: local campagnia creditors enjoyed
priority, a status both reflected in and reinforced by the hub-and-spoke framework used
by the Medici banking empire, with separate partnerships for each of the cities where the
bank established a presence. Like the Roman societas publicanorum, the Italian
commenda, which was first used for shipping ventures, resembled the modern limited
partnership, with limited liability, strong entity shielding and tradeable partnership
interests. Later still, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the forbears of today’s
giant publicly held corporations emerged. The Dutch East India Company and England’s
East India Company were given limited liability and strong entity shielding by their
respective sovereigns; these protections, as well as the monopoly privileges the
companies enjoyed, fueled a vibrant market in their shares.
Throughout this early history, the Catholic church played a prominent role in
legitimizing corporate enterprise. “[T]he church rejected the Roman view that apart from
5
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public corporations ... only collegia recognized as corporations by the imperial authority
were to have the privileges and liberties of corporations,” Harold Berman has written.
“In contrast, under canon law any group of persons which had the requisite structure and
purpose– for example an almshouse or a hospital or a body of students, as well as a
bishopric or, indeed, the Church Universal– constituted a corporation, without special
permission of a higher authority.”6 The participants in Christian enterprises, which
included many of the largest businesses of the medieval and early modern period, entered
into contracts and defended against debt collection actions as a collective, rather than
individuals. (Only much later did they begin to own property collectively, however;
Christian enterprises hewed to the Germanic practice of holding assets in the names of
each of the members).7 One scholar has recently attributed the popularity and acceptance
of corporate enterprise to the absence of strong states after the decline of the Roman
Empire. “The consequent power vacuum provided incentives as well as opportunities to
institute private legal systems as a means of enhancing organizational efficiency,” he
argues, with particular reference to the development of canon law. “The resulting
process of incorporation fed on itself as new corporations increased experience and
familiarity with decentralized governance.”8 The church-related corporations that thrived
in this environment differed from modern for-profit corporations in crucial respects due
to their nonprofit status. Other than salaries, they were not permitted to make
distributions to their members; nor did they have tradable ownership interests. This
meant that many of the characteristic dilemmas of modern corporations, such as the need
to police distributions and to protect minority shareholders from oppression by the
majority, did not arise in the same way in even the largest Christian enterprises. But the
church was squarely in the middle of the early evolution of the corporation, not just
acceding to the idea of collective, nonpublic enterprise but serving as its most important
exemplar.
6

Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), pp. 216, 219.
7

Ibid. p. 219.

8

Timur Kuran, “The Absence of the Corporation in Islamic Law: Origins and
Persistence,” Am. J. Comp. L. 53 (2005), 785, 793.

5

Nineteenth Century Ideology and the Modern Corporation

While there were important predecessors, such as the Dutch East India Company
and the East India Company in the 17th and 18th centuries, the modern corporation truly
came into its own in England and the United States in the nineteenth century. Two
further regulatory developments set the stage. The first was a radical loosening of the
constraints on forming a corporation. In 1720, England had enacted the Bubble Act to
curb the formation of joint stock companies, the predecessors of the modern corporation.
The Bubble Act “was widely understood to have been enacted for the benefit of the South
Sea Company,” as historian Stuart Banner has noted, “as a means of driving a large swath
of alternative investment vehicles from the market, thus channeling more capital into
South Sea shares.”9 But when a bubble of speculative investment burst shortly after its
enactment, the Bubble Act served as a general indictment of joint-stock companies.
Under the act, the only way to obtain all the benefits of the corporate form was to petition
the crown for a formal charter. It was quite difficult to obtain a charter, which meant that
the number of new corporate charters was quite small.
The same stance toward corporations also made its way across the Atlantic to
America. From the beginning, the states were the ones who dispensed corporate charters
(this tradition explains why so much of US corporate law continues to be regulated by the
states today); and state lawmakers initially were quite stingy with this privilege. Most
states granted only a handful each year, and most went either to nonprofit entities like
churches or schools, or for very specific projects. If a state needed a bridge or canal, it
would grant a charter to a bridge- or canal-building company. In practice, these
corporations were more like branches of state government– like little administrative
agencies– than like the corporations of today.
During the course of the nineteenth century, however, the genteel pattern of
carefully regulated corporate charters began to break down as opportunities to make
9
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money in mining, manufacturing, and other areas proliferated. In England, entrepreneurs
had long evaded the strictures of the Bubble Act by creating unincorporated joint stock
companies, which relied on a combination of partnership and trust law to achieve many
of the benefits of incorporation. In 1844, Parliament abandoned its century-long
resistence to corporations and enacted legislation permitting nearly anyone to form one.
In the United States, Louisiana led the way, abolishing the system of special
incorporation in 1845. A number of states adopted dual systems with both special and
general incorporation thereafter, but by the last two decades of the nineteenth century,
specialized incorporation had been abandoned everywhere. In 1800, there had been 335
corporate charters in the U.S. By 1890, the number would be nearly 500,000.10
The second key development was limited liability. Here, the watershed came in
1855, when Parliament amended the 1844 Act to authorize limited liability at the option
of the entrepreneurs who established a corporation. The fact that limited liability came
eleven years after the original legislation is not accidental. Although limited liability was
not a new idea, providing it as a standard feature of general incorporation proved quite
controversial. Christian leaders featured prominently in the debate, which unfolded
against the background of the larger debate about free market economics in nineteenth
century England.
In the first half of the nineteenth century, mainstream evangelical leaders
vigorously supported the free trade policies known as laissez faire economics. “Barriers
to Free Trade,” they argued, as recounted by a British historian, “like monopolies,
protective duties, and preferences, not only offended the unprivileged, but were elements
of friction obscuring God’s clockwork providence.”11 Free trade was thus equated with
the recognition of God’s providence in all of life. Thomas Chalmers, the leading
spokesman for the evangelical perspective, also extolled the chastening effects of free
markets. He argued that fear of disaster would encourage businessman to practice moral
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restraint in their business ventures, and that the failures of those who did not would
chasten them, perhaps spurring an attitude of repentance for their excesses.
In the debate over limited liability in the 1850s, both sides tried to characterize
their views as a manifestation of free market economics. Opponents insisted that limited
liability interfered with the market by limiting an entrepreneur’s exposure to the risks he
undertook; enthusiasts countered that entrepreneurs should be permitted to set up
whatever structure they wished, so long as they provided full disclosure to potential
investors. Most mainstream evangelicals took the former view. “In the scheme laid
down by Providence for the government of the world,” as one limited liability critic put
this view, “there is no shifting or narrowing of responsibilities, every man being
personally answerable to the utmost extent for all his actions.”12 Groups such as the
Christian Socialists, who defended limited liability, arguing that it might enable people of
modest means to invest in corporate enterprise, were a distinct minority among
Christians. But the range of people who would benefit from limited liability (such as
existing, well off investors) or who favored it on social grounds was wide and deep by
the 1850s. Within a few years, the argument that business people should be exposed to
the full rigors of the market would lose much of its resonance in English politics, even
among evangelicals.
In the U.S., Christian groups seemed to show much less concern about the advent
of limited liability than their English peers. It was not limited liability so much as its
fruits that stirred Christian leaders and groups into action.

Regulating America’s New Large Scale Corporations

The large scale corporation as we now know it was born in the late nineteenth
century, most pervasively in the United States and particularly in the railroad industry.
As the railroads expanded, revolutionizing transportation and at the same time benefitting
from the markets created by this revolution, they adopted increasingly hierarchical
12
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business structures, with a class of middle managers between the railroad’s workers and
its executive officers. So long as shareholders enjoyed limited liability and thus were not
responsible for its obligations if it failed, it wasn’t necessary that they actively manage or
oversee the business. This made it much easier to separate ownership from management
and to develop a specialized class of managers, and it radically expanded the pool of
potential investors.
The same railroads that emerged as America’s first large scale corporations also
provided the first great corporate scandals.13 Railroad owners could make enormous
profits by taking control of important segments of track and charging as much as the
market would bear. The swashbucklers who played this game, men like Jay Gould, Drew
Drew, and Jim Fisk, have long been known as the robber barons. (The Erie Railway, the
subject of the most infamous of the railroad battles in the early 1870s, became known as
the “Scarlet Woman of Wall Street” because of the rampant bribery and other
misbehavior used by both groups of combatants in the fight for control, one led by
Cornelius Vanderbilt and the other by Daniel Drew and Jay Gould). In 1873, the travails
of America’s second transcontinental railroad, the Northern Pacific, toppled Philadelphia
banker Jay Cooke and his bank, triggering a nationwide economic depression. Cooke’s
failure spurred a populist backlash that ultimately led the enactment of the Interstate
Commerce Act of 1887, which established federal regulation of railroads; and the
Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 to prohibit monopolization of industry.
By 1890, the railroads were not the only large scale corporations. To circumvent
state corporate laws that prevented one corporation from owning the stock of another,
John D. Rockefeller and others created “trusts” to consolidate control of a variety of
industries, from oil to sugar and tobacco. Although the Sherman Act was designed to
thwart monopolization of industry, but it was narrowly construed by the Supreme Court
in 1895. In part as a result, the decade that followed, which became known as the Great
Merger Wave, saw even greater consolidation. Although some of the new behemoths
were controlled by a Rockefeller or Havemeyer, many were midwifed by J.P. Morgan
13
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and other investment banks. These companies were held not by a single controlling
individual group, but by thousands of shareholders, each of whom may have held a
relatively small stake.
The emergence of large scale corporations raised two related, but conceptually
distinct, kinds of concerns. First is the risk that the managers and directors of a
corporation will take actions that benefit themselves rather than shareholders. In several
of the railroad scandals, the managers started construction companies, which built track
under contracts that plumped the managers bank accounts at the expense of the railroad
and its shareholders. The second concern was that a corporation would act in a way that
benefitted itself and its stakeholders at the expense of everyone else. Here, as already
noted, the overriding concern was monopoly– the danger that corporations would snuff
out competition in their industry and charge exorbitant prices to consumers.
While it is difficult to precisely trace the Christian influence on American
corporations in the nineteenth century, due to the limits of existing historical scholarship
and because Christianity was often a pervasive but unstated background assumption in
American life, it is probably fair to say that the same factors that produced American
denominationalism and Christian support for free markets assured a general sympathy for
the corporate form. But this enthusiasm receded when it came to the corporate trusts,
which struck many as inconsistent with market competition and some as a form of private
socialism.
By nearly any yardstick, the nation’s most visible and influential evangelical
Christian in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was William Jennings
Bryan, the charismatic orator whose “Cross of Gold” speech had propelled him to the
Democratic presidential nomination for the first of three times in 1896. From the outset
of his political career, Bryan’s Populist attacks on corporate power were a signature
theme, along with his insistence on loosening links between the dollar and gold.
Excoriating the effects of the Great Merger Wave in the 1900 campaign and arguing for
more competition, Bryan concluded: “There can be no good monopoly in private hands
until the Almighty sends us angels to preside over the monopoly.”14 Bryan briefly went
14
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so far as to argue for government ownership of the railroads, but backed off when it
became clear that advocating federal control would cost him any hope of support in the
South.
Although a large majority of Christians and of Americans seemed to have worried
about the power of large corporations, Christian opinion was not monolithic even on this
point. J.P. Morgan, the architect of many of the leading trusts, was himself a committed
Christian. Morgan believed that unbridled corporate competition was destructive, and
that trusts run by himself and others with genuine character could produce goods and
provide services much more efficiently than fragmented industries with numerous
competing corporations.
A third major figure was Walter Rauschenbusch, one of the leaders of the Social
Gospel movement, which advocated greater Christian involvement in social change.
Although Rauschenbush, like his Social Gospel peers, was more theologically liberal
than Bryan, the two admired one another and shared similar views of corporate
regulation. Drawing on Jesus’s parables on stewardship, Rauschenbusch called for
federal oversight of trust, especially “natural monopolies” like railroads and utilities.
These corporations, he wrote:

are stewards and have acted as if they were the owners. The present movement
for rate-regulation, for instance, is simply an effort to assert the rights of the
owner over the steward, and the aggrieved astonishment with which this
movement has been met by the class that owns the railways is interesting proof
that the usual historical process was very far advanced.15

By the turn of the century, immigration had vastly increased the number of
Catholics among American Christians. Some of the campaigns with which leaders like
Bryan and Rauschenbush were associated, such as the Temperance movement, were at
15
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least in part anti-Catholic and anti-immigrant. But their concern about corporate
influence echoed emerging Catholic views in important respects. Pope Leo XIII’s 1891
letter Rerum novarum inaugurated a tradition of Catholic Social Thought that has
generally defended the interests of labor and called for restraints on the power of
corporations.16
As reflected in the major Protestant Christian periodicals of the time, the weight
of Christian opinion seems to have favored at least some governmental regulation of
corporations. Outlook, a leading Social Gospel magazine, opined that “corporations
deriving their existence from the hands of the people must submit to regulation by the
people,” a view echoed by other articles of the time.17
In keeping with the overwhelming emphasis on the second of the dangers posed
by the emergence of large scale corporations, monopoly, much of the regulatory response
in the early twentieth century focused on counteracting the market power of the largest
corporations. The single most successful initiative was Theodore Roosevelt’s “trust
busting” campaign, whose landmark achievement was a 1904 Supreme Court decision
that broke up the North Securities Corporation, a trust that combined the two
transcontinental railroads. The Roosevelt administration also saw the enactment of the
Railway Rate Regulation Law in 1906, and the 1907 Tillman Act, which prohibited
corporations from making contributions directly to political candidates. Roosevelt even
threw his weight behind proposed legislation that would have federalized the
incorporation of the nation’s corporations. The failure of this last initiative, federal
incorporation, ultimately contributed to a sharp distinction in American law between
internal corporate governance issues (the conflicts of interest between managers and
shareholders that are regulated primarily by the states) and “external” concerns such as
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antitrust, employment law and environmental law (much of which are now regulated by
federal law).
The legislative and judicial efforts described in the last paragraph have
historically been attributed to the Progressive movement, which achieved its greatest
prominence during the early twentieth century. After the Democrats finally regained the
White House in 1913, the Progressive movement achieved several additional regulatory
victories with the enactment of the Clayton Anti-Trust Act in 1914, which restricted
directors from serving on the boards of directors of their competitors, and the creation of
the Federal Trade Commission to police the trusts. While Progressivism was not
conspicuously Christian in orientation, there were close links to the Social Gospel. Some
historians have suggested that the Social Gospel movement laid the groundwork for
Progressivism through its support for labor and social change, and Social Gospelers were
both participants in and cheerleaders for the Progressives’ efforts to enact corporate
regulation.
By the second decade of the twentieth century, then, large scale corporations were
generally accepted, but a variety of measures had been put in place to protect competition
within the marketplace. These measures reduced the risk of monopoly (at least by
industrial corporations; J.P. Morgan and a small group of other investment banks
continued to monopolize American corporate finance.) Although less identifiably
Christian than Prohibition or even Women’s Suffrage, the Progressive reforms seem to
have been influenced by the Social Gospel (as well as the evangelical constituency
represented by William Jennings Bryan) and to have reflected the general views of most
American Christians.

The Federal Council of Churches and The New Deal

The New Deal brought sweeping federal regulation of American corporate and
financial life, establishing what still are the basic parameters of American corporate
regulation. Perhaps most dramatically, Congress completely restructured the banking
industry. The Glass-Steagall Act drove a wedge between commercial and investment
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banking by prohibiting banks from providing both loans (the standard fare of a
commercial bank) and underwriting (investment banks’ bread and butter). The goal,
quite candidly stated by the New Dealers, was to destroy the monopoly J.P. Morgan and
its peers had on American corporate finance and to limit their influence over large scale
American corporations. To enhance oversight of and confidence in the securities
markets, Congress enacted new securities regulation in 1933 and 1934. The securities
acts require extensive disclosure by large scale corporations; and they created the
Securities and Exchange Commission to police the markets on investors’ behalf.
In several of the speeches laying the groundwork for corporate and financial
reform, Franklin D. Roosevelt employed distinctively religious rhetoric. One of the most
important economic speeches of Roosevelt’s 1932 campaign condemned Chicago utilities
magnate Samuel Insull, whose dramatic collapse had stunned the nation, and vowed to
take arms against “the Ishmael or Insull, whose hand is against every man’s.”18 While
this call to protect the little guy against the predations of a corporate titan echoed Bryan’s
earlier Democratic presidential campaigns, the religious landscape in American politics
had dramatically shifted by the outset of the New Deal. Starting in roughly 1925, the
year of the Scopes trial and Bryan’s death, evangelicals had increasingly absented
themselves from American political life. One can find occasional articles in evangelical
magazines condemning the corporate scandals that followed the 1929 stock market crash,
but evangelicals did not play any visible role in Roosevelt administration or the New
Deal generally.
Christian involvement in Roosevelt’s New Deal coalition seems to have come not
from evangelicals, but from mainline Protestants, the principal heirs of the Social Gospel,
and from Catholics. The Federal Council of Churches, which was founded in 1908 and
had become the leading interdenominational voice of mainline Protestantism, was
actively involved in New Deal labor and work legislation and seems to have supported
the banking and securities reforms, though not as visibly. At the outset of the New Deal,
The Christian Century, the most widely read journal of progressive Christianity, ran a
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series of articles on economic issues, most applauding the New Deal initiatives and some
calling for even more radical regulation (in one case, for government control of banks).19
Catholic Americans were the other major Christian New Deal constituency. By
the early twentieth century, Catholicism claimed more adherents than any of the
Protestant denominations– and most supported Roosevelt and his reformers. Perhaps the
most visible representative of progressive Catholic support was Father John Ryan, who
had popularized the term “living wage” several decades earlier and mounted a spirited
defense of New Deal legislation that included skirmishes on the radio and in print with
demagogic priest Father Coughlin.20
Christian views on the New Deal business and financial legislation were no more
monolithic than the views of Americans generally. Nor were Christians the most visible
advocates for the reforms. But leading figures in mainline Protestantism and among
progressive Catholics defended the New Deal program, and the reforms can be traced, at
least indirectly, to the political vision that Bryan and the Social Gospels promoted
decades earlier.

The New Corporate and Financial Marketplace

In the past twenty-five years, the governance of large scale corporations has been
transformed yet again, though more through the marketplace than by regulation.
Corporate takeovers have been a standard feature of the corporate landscape for several
decades, and shareholder-centered governance is increasingly the norm not just in the
U.S. and England, but in much of the world. Seemingly endless innovation in financial
instruments and the rise of equity and hedge funds has provided new sources of financing
and new ways to manage risk, as well as intense pressure to perform. The U.S. corporate
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scandals subjected these developments to scrutiny, but did not significantly alter any of
the underlying trends.
Protestant views on these issues fall into two major camps. The mainline
Protestant denominations, at least at the leadership level, have favored extensive
governmental oversight of corporations, as they did during the New Deal. Although the
evangelical left in America differs with mainline Protestants on other issues, they
generally share a desire to rein in large corporations. Both enthusiastically supported the
corporate responsibility reforms that the U.S. Congress enacted after the Enron and
WorldCom scandals. The evangelical right (which includes a substantial majority of
evangelicals by most accounts) has been much less supportive of intervention. Since
their re-emergence in American political life starting in the 1970s, most of these
evangelicals have favored free markets and limited government involvement.
Catholic perspectives fall into a similar pattern. Although Catholic theologian
Michael Novak is best known for his fervent, theological defense of free market
economics, he has also defended the corporation and called for limited governmental
intrusion, arguing that this best accords with the tradition of Catholic Social Thought.21
Others argue that a more hands on regulatory approach is most consistent with the
concerns of Catholic Social Thought.
One difficulty in making sense of current Christian perspectives on corporate
regulation is that corporate regulation has been a secondary concern for many Christians,
particularly among Protestants. The evangelical right has invested less energy on
economic issues than on social ones, and the principal economic emphasis has been free
markets and a general distaste for regulation rather than corporate and securities law.
Mainline Protestants and the evangelical left have been most concerned with the
pervasive Biblical concern for the poor and for other social issues such as race relations.
Corporations have figured more prominently in Catholic discourse, due in important part
to the papal letters of Pope John Paul II on economic issues, but here too they have not
loomed as large (particularly in the U.S.) as other issues.
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Christian perspectives on corporations also can be very difficult to distinguish
from secular perspectives. Perhaps this was inevitable. Once the corporate form and the
legitimacy of limited liability were accepted, and so long as government ownership of
corporations is largely ruled out, the range of internal corporate governance issues around
which one might develop a theology of the corporation is relatively limited. The hiving
off of antitrust, employment law and other issues “external” to the corporation from
corporate law in the U.S., and treating them as separate bodies of law, has reinforced this
narrowness.
Yet the opportunities for developing a distinctively Christian critique of
contemporary corporate law, and for shaping the coming generation, are extraordinary.
One approach is to construct a theology of the corporation and of corporate
responsibility. Drawing on Catholic Social Thought, a small group of Catholic legal
scholars have taken tentative first steps toward such a theology.22 Protestant scholars
have been slower to develop a careful theological analysis of the corporation, but the
seeds of such an analysis are scattered through modern Protestant theology, in the work
of Rauschenbusch, Abraham Kuyper, Reinhold Niebuhr and others.
Other scholars may come at these questions from a slightly different perspective:
how much can, or should, the secular law do to regulate corporate life? In recent work,
William Stuntz and I have argued that, while God’s law is pervasive, human law should
be far more modest in its aspirations.23 Because regulators and law enforcers are sinful,
just as ordinary citizens are, we should be wary of laws that are too broad to be
systematically enforced; sweeping discretion invites discriminatory enforcement. Law
works best if its ambitions are modest, leaving wider scope for ordinary morality. In
corporate law, this modest rule of law principle suggests that it is a mistake to try
prescribe the do’s and don’ts of proper manager and director behavior by law– especially
22
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through criminal sanctions. A narrower objective might be to focus principally on
removing obvious structural perversities in the market and regulatory framework.
Structural flaws were a major factor in the corporate scandals of the early 2000s. The
oversight of auditors and securities analysts, for instance, was undermined by structural
conflicts of interest that discouraged each from giving candid, honest assessments of the
companies they investigated in the 1990s. The tendency to overuse stock option-based
compensation, which can tempt corporate executives to pump up the company’s stock
price through any means possible, was exacerbated by a tax rule that rewarded companies
for paying executives with options rather than cash. Some of these structural problems
have been fixed; others (such as the compensation rule) have not.
Christianity also offers insights that are more cultural than legal in form. One of
most sobering lessons of the recent corporate scandals was the extent to which sin can
pervade every facet of institutional life. Perhaps the most vivid illustration was Enron,
whose employees were herded into a room and pretended to conduct a vibrant trading
market when a group of analysts made the trip to Houston to visit the firm. The
psychological literature suggests that our tendency to conform to those around us, even if
what they do is clearly wrong, and to obey authority, helps to explain the poisonous
internal culture at companies like Enron. But the literature also shows that if even one
person takes a stand, the likelihood of misbehavior sharply declines. Christian scripture
offers rich insight into the benefits of maintaining a moral compass, not least in the
emotionally honest prayers of the psalms. “I have hidden your word in my heart,” one of
the psalmists proclaims, “that I might not sin against you.” Ps. 119. Jesus’s servant and
steward parables provide similarly useful instruction on fiduciary relationships, and
might contribute to a board’s deliberations about its fiduciary responsibilities.24 As each
of these illustrations suggests, it took more than law alone to create large scale
corporations, and it will take a lot more than law to sustain them.

24
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